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Until  the  development  of  transaction-cost  theory,  economics did  not  have 
a theory  of  why  firms  exist  and  grow.  Transaction  costs theory  seeks to  ex- 
plain  which  activities  are  organized  within  the  firm  and  which  ones are  per- 
formed  by  independent  agents. It  is  a  theory  of  the  role  and  size  of  firms. 
Since  multinational  enterprises  are  firms  that  extend  their  hierarchies  across 
national  boundaries,  transaction  costs theory  can  throw  considerable  light  on 
the reasons behind  the existence and the growth  of  such firms  [4;  17; 9;  15]. 
With  a  few  notable exceptions [5: 9;  15], most applications  of  the  trans- 
action  costs approach  to  the  multinational  enterprise  have  focused  on  the  in- 
ternalization  of  knowledge.  This  reflects  the  postwar  predominance  of  hori- 
zontal  investments in  manufacturing  by  knowledge-intensive  firms.  This  em- 
phasis on the  internalization  of  knowledge  as a cause of  multinational  expan- 
sion may  have given  the erroneous impression that  the  applicability  of  trans- 
action  costs theory  is restricted  to post-World War II  multinational  enterprises. 
This  paper  argues  that  this  is  not  the  case. It  seeks to  explain  the  exis- 
tence and  growth  of  multinational  enterprises  in  the  tin  industry,  and,  in  the 
process, shows that  transaction  costs can  be  used to  account  for  a  very  wide 
range  of  multinational  enterprises,  including  those that  do  not  fit  the  tradi- 
tional  mold. Recent  research in  business history  has shown that  the  growth  of 
European  multinational  enterprises  differed  in  many  ways  from  that  of  their 
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European  counterparts,  and  that  British  foreign  direct  investment  often  took 
unfamiliar  forms  [24; 25].  This  paper  suggests  that  transaction  costs theory 
may  prove  useful  in  explaining  these forms  as well. 
APPLICATION  OF  TRANSACTION  COST  ANALYSIS  TO  THE  TIN 
INDUSTRY 
A  firm's  expansion  overseas can  take  four  forms:  horizontal  expansion 
(producing  abroad  the same products as at home); vertical  integration  (into  an 
adjacent  stage  of  the  value-added  chain);  related  diversification;  and  con- 
glomerate  diversification.  Most  foreign  direct  investments  fall  into  the  first 
two  categories. 
Horizontal  investments result  from  the internalization  by  the  firm  of  the 
international  trade  in  factors  of  production.  Many  horizontal  investments are 
made whenever  firms  find  it  more efficient  to  transfer  know-how  internally 
than  across markets.  Technological  know-how  is not,  however,  the  only  factor 
susceptible  to  be  internalized  by  firms.  High  market  transaction  costs  in 
goodwill  explain  many investments in  services [9]. As we  will  see, imperfec- 
tions  in  international  capital  markets  can  also  lead  to  the  development  of 
multinational  firms. 
Vertical  investments  arise  from  the  internalization  of  the  international 
market  for  intermediate  inputs. Forward  vertical  integration  is typically  mo- 
tivated  by  the  high  cost of  using  independent  wholesalers  or  retailers  when- 
ever  distribution  involves  specific  assets, as in  the  case of  products  requiring 
specialized  handling  or  service  [15].  Backward  vertical  integration  arises 
when  the  international  market  for  the supply of  intermediate  products is in- 
efficient  due  to  information  impactedness, high  measurement costs, or  small- 
number  conditions. 
Historically,  the  development  of  multinational  enterprises  in  the  tin  in- 
dustry  has  arisen  from  two  main  factors:  the  internalization  of  inefficient 
markets  for  technology  and  long-term  capital  led  to  the  establishment  of  a 
large  number  of  "free  standing" firms  during  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth 
century.  The  desire  to  internalize  inefficient  markets  in  tin  concentrates  led 
to  the  development  of  vertically-integrated  multinational  enterprises  in  the 
lode sector of  the industry. 
Horizontal  Investments 
The  incentive  for  horizontal  foreign  direct  investments in tin  came in the 
late  1800s from  the rapid  expansion of  British  tin  consumption and  the  grad- 
ual  exhaustion  of  Cornish  mines,  then  the  main  tin  producers.  Although  a 149 
few  French and British  firms  were established in  Malaya  and  in  Bolivia  in 
the  1890s, horizontal  FDI  took  off  in  the  first  decade of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury  with  a gradual  increase in  British  foreign  direct  investments in  Malaya 
and  a  speculative  wave  of  flotations  of  Nigerian  tin  mining  companies. In- 
vestments by  British  firms  in  Nigeria  and  Malaya,  and  to  a  lesser extent  in 
Burma  and  Siam,  continued  until  the  1950s, and,  in  the  late  1960s, foreign 
companies,  almost all  U.K.-registered, were producing 70 percent of  Nigeria's 
output,  and 60 percent of  that  of  Malaysia  [3, p. 35]. 
Those tin  mining  companies were what  Mira  Wilkins [24] has called "free- 
standing" firms.  Most of  them were incorporated in  the U.K.,  but  did  all  of 
their  business overseas. In  the  case of  Malaya  and  Siam, they  were  usually 
small: each company managed a single deposit. Even contiguous deposits were 
incorporated  as separate  firms.  To  achieve  economies of  scale, free  standing 
firms  resorted  to  subcontracting:  secretarial  services in  the  U.K.  were  con- 
tracted  to specialist  firms,  who held  share registers and  provided  other  secre- 
tarial  services  to  more  than  one  firm.  Arrangements  for  local  management 
varied:  sometimes it  was subcontracted  to consulting  engineers, sometimes to a 
local  mine  manager, with  technical  assistance from  mining  engineers, some- 
times  to  friends  and  relatives  of  some of  the  London  promoters,  and,  rarely 
in  the  case of  tin,  to  agency houses.  Consulting  engineers, such as Osborne 
and  Chappell  of  Ipoh,  Malaya,  helped manage a  large  number  of  foreign- 
based mining  companies.  This  arrangement allowed relatively  small firms  to 
access the  limited  pool of  experienced  local  personnel. 
The historical record of tin  mining in Malaya and Siam suggests  that hor- 
izontal  multinational  enterprises  in  the  tin  industry  were  caused  by  inef- 
ficiencies  in  the  international  market  for  technology  and  capital.  A  privi- 
leged access  to capital, in the absence  of  a clear technological advantage, was 
insufficient  to  overcome  the  additional  costs of  adapting  to  a  foreign  envi- 
ronment. Foreign  firms  gained  a  foothold  when  they  developed new  tech- 
niques  which  offset  their  initial  handicaps.  Because these  innovative  tech- 
niques were mainly  developed outside the industry,  they could be bought by 
their  local competitors. Privileged  access  to capital  appears to have been the 
crucial  factor  which  gave foreign  direct  investors a clear  advantage,  at  least 
until  the development of  international  capital  markets in the 1960s. 
That  technological advantage was a requirement for  the development of 
multinational  enterprises in  the industry  appears clearly  from  the early  his- 
tory of  Western investments in  Malaya  and Siam. Up  until  the  1890s, the de- 
velopment of  tin  mining  in  Malaya  was a purely  Chinese endeavor. Chinese 
immigrants  used primitive,  labor  intensive  methods to  mine  and  concentrate 
the tin  ore. Between 1882 and  1897, 35 companies were registered in  the  U.K. 
to  mine  tin  in  Malaya.  There  were also an  unknown number of  Australian 
and  French  ventures.  By  1897,  only  four  Western  companies  were  still  ac- 150 
tively  mining tin  in Malaya, all  the others having folded [28, pp. 97-99; 26, p. 
143]. 
The  British  and  French  firms  which  invested  in  Malaya  were  experienced 
in  mining  lode tin.  Tin  deposits in Malaya,  with  the exception of  one deposit 
in  the  state  of  Pahang,  are  alluvial.  Many  of  the  mining  and  prospecting 
techniques with  which  foreigners  were  familiar  were  therefore  not  suited  to 
Malayan  conditions:  given  the  difficulty  of  assessing alluvial  deposits,  the 
high  fixed-investment  Western mining  methods were  a handicap,  for  it  meant 
that  it  was costly to discontinue mining  once started. Chinese miners, on the 
other hand,  mined with  labor  intensive  methods. They  could easily  abandon a 
disappointing  deposit for  a profitable  one [28, pp. 102-3]. 
European  firms  had  also disadvantages  vis-a-vis  Chinese  miners. The  best 
workers  were  immigrant  Chinese.  European  firms  found  it  difficult  to  obtain 
Chinese mine  workers  because the  immigration  system was tightly  controlled 
by  Chinese  mine  owners.  European  mine  managers had  to  hire  Chinese  inter- 
preters  and  overseer.  s to  supervise  Chinese  labor,  a  source  of  additional  cost. 
The  Chinese,  having  come first,  controlled  the  best mining  land.  The  superior 
efficiency  of  the  Chinese during  the  period  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that 
they  often  successfully took  over  the  land  abandoned  by  bankrupt  Western 
companies [21,  p.  341].  Western firms  did  better  in  lode  mining,  where  they 
had  a technological  advantage.  The  Pahang  Corporation,  floated  in  London  in 
1887 to  exploit  the  largest  of  Malaya's  tin  lodes, was  one of  the  four  surviv- 
ing  firms  by  1897. 
Western  dominance  in  Malaya  (and  Siam)  was  achieved  by  the  introduc- 
tion  of  two  new  mining  techniques, first  gravel  pumping,  and  then  dredging. 
Both  these methods were  borrowed  from  another  mineral  industry,  gold  min- 
ing.  Both  allowed  Western  foreign  direct  investors to  overcome  the  handicaps 
they  had  vis-a-vis  the  Chinese. Gravel  pumping,  which  used jets  of  water  to 
break  the  ore,  had  two  main  advantages:  (1) it  saved  on  skilled  (Chinese)  la- 
bor; (2)  it  could treat  very  poor deposits, which  could not be profitably  mined 
by  the  Chinese. 
Tin  dredging  was  introduced  in  Siam  in  1907.  Dredging  intensified  the 
advantages  of  gravel  pumping.  It  was  labor  saving:  by  World  War  I  a  typical 
dredge,  employing  90  Chinese  under  European  supervision,  could  extract  and 
treat  in  one day  as much tin-bearing  ground as 2,000  Chinese in  a traditional 
mine [28, p. 134]. Dredges could efficiently  operate on swampy ground, where 
Chinese  could  not  mine.  They  could  also  profitably  work  very  low  grade 
deposits, including  ground which  had been already  mined by the Chinese [28, 
p.  133]. 151 
In  contrast  to  tin  smelting, the  technology of  both  gravel  pumping  and 
dredging  was not  developed  by  the  mining  firms  themselves, but  by  subcon- 
tractors. Gravel  pumps were  manufactured  by  Western engineering  firms  sup- 
plying  the gold mining  industry. They  were initially  imported into Malaya  by 
Malaya-based  European  mining  engineering  firms,  who  taught  Chinese mine 
owners  how  to  use  them.  By  1925,  nearly  all  Chinese  mines  used gravel 
pumps, which  by  then  were  locally  manufactured  [27,  pp. 210-11;  1, p.  153]. 
Dredges  were  designed and  set up  by  specialist  firms  and  built  by  indepen- 
dent  shipyards. The  skills  needed to operate  dredges were  quickly  picked  up 
by the  Chinese: as early  as 1917 they  were  employed as winchmen  on Euro- 
pean dredges "with great satisfaction" [7, p. 79]. 
Yet,  in  contrast  to  the  gravel  pump  sector, where  Western enterprise  was 
soon displaced by  the Chinese, dredging  remained  the safe preserve of  West- 
ern  firms,  and  the  development  of  this  technique  between  1920 and  1927 gave 
them  the  control  of  the  industry.  By  1940,  dredging  companies, all  Western 
controlled,  accounted for  52 percent of  Malaya's  tin  output,  where  the overall 
share  of  Western  firms  was  71.5  percent,  and  60 percent  of  Siam's  production 
[28,  pp. 400,  402;  23,  p.  62].  The  first  Chinese-owned  dredging  company  did 
not  start  operations  until  1965. 
The  difference  in  the  speed of  Chinese  adoption  of  dredges  and  gravel 
pump  points  out  to  an  important  advantage  which  led  to  the  long-term  sur- 
vival  of  Western  firms.  The  advantage  was  privileged  access to  the  London 
equity  market.  While  the  capital  cost to equip  a  mine  with  gravel  pumps is 
relatively  modest, dredges are  much  more expensive (the  cost of  a  relatively 
large  gravel  pump mine  was estimated  in  1977 at  around  half  a million  USS, 
vs. 15 million  for  an  onshore, and  25  million  for  an  offshore  dredge)  [2,  pp. 
71-74,  145]. Financing  such investments posed problems for  the  Chinese. Do- 
mestic sources of  finance  were  limited,  as the  Malayan  Chinese  remitted  a 
large  part  of  their  savings to  their  relatives  in  China,  or  invested  them  in 
mortgages or real estate [19, p. 116]. The  British banks which  had branches in 
Malaya  followed  the  British  banking  tradition  of  specializing  in  short  term 
credit  to  finance  foreign  trade  and  commercial activities,  leaving  the provi- 
sion  of  long-term  financing  to  the  London  stock  exchange  [1,  p.  203;  11,  p. 
232;  12,  p.  150]. The  flotation  of  joint  stock  companies in  London  or  in 
Cornwall  was  an  efficient  way  to  accumulate  the  long-term  sources of  fi- 
nance necessary to enter dredging. Because  shares in  such companies could be 
easily  sold, the  risk  to  the  investor  was  lower.  The  Chinese,  whose familiar 
forms  of  organization  were  individual  ownerships or partnerships,  and  whose 
capital  came  from  relatives  and  friends,  were  unfamiliar  with  joint  stock 
companies, and unwilling  to adopt this new form  of  organization  [28, p. 347]. 
Furthermore,  they  lacked the European connections that  would  have  made a 
London  (or Redruth)  flotation  possible. 152 
To  understand  why  British-based  firms  may  have  had  an  advantage  in 
this respect, one must focus on the characteristics  of  capital  markets. Because 
of  the  non-slmultaneity  of  both sides of  the transaction, lending  involves the 
risk  that  the  borrower  may be unable  to  meet his obligations, either  because 
he has willfully  spent the  funds  with  no intentions  to  repay,  or  because he 
has  been  unsuccessful  in  his  investments.  The  easiest  way  for  the  lender  to 
protect  himself  is to  obtain  some collateral,  the  value  of  which  is greater  to 
the  lender  than  the  value  of  the  loan.  Another  possibility  is  to  lend  only  to 
borrowers  who  are  personally  known  to  the  lender  as having  both  the  inten- 
tion  and  the  ability  to  honor  their  obligations.  These  considerations  suggest 
that  raising  capital  will  be  easier  the  greater  the  personal  contacts  between 
savers and  borrowers,  the  larger  the  borrower's  assets, and  the  longer  he  has 
been  profitably  in  business. Foreign  entrepreneurs,  especially  if  they  are 
proposing new,  unproved  ventures,  are  at  a  special  disadvantage,  since it  is 
difficult  for  them  to  establish  personal  contacts  with  .savers. Conversely,  do- 
mestic savers are unlikely  to be aware  of  foreign  investment  opportunities. 
A  look  at  early  British  free-standing  firms  active  in  Malaya  shows 
clearly  how  such firms  could  reduce  transaction  costs in  the  international 
transfer  of  capital  from  the  U.K.  Many  of  the  first  successful ones were 
floated  in  Redruth,  then  the center  of  Cornish  tin  mining--this  was the  case, 
for  example,  for  the  Gopeng Tin  Mining  Co.,  established  in  1892, the  first 
company to  successfully operate  gravel  pumps in  Malaya.  The  story  of  the 
company starts with  a concession  to mine tin  being granted to F. D. Osborne, 
an Irish  mining  engineer  then in  Malaya,  and  to the former  Warden  of  Mines 
of  the  State  of  Perak,  E.  R.  Pike.  Pike  was  the  son of  a  well-known  Cornish 
mine  purser,  and  he  enlisted  the  help  of  his  father  to  contact  a  local  share 
broker,  James Wickett,  who,  in  turn,  persuaded  10 of  his  friends  to  put  700 
pounds each  into  the  company.  All  of  these  10 initial  subscribers  were  major 
investors  in  Cornish  mines.  Later,  James  Wickett's  son,  a  mining  engineer, 
went  to Malaya  to  report  and  prospect on mines, which,  in  some cases, were 
subsequently floated  by  his father.  The  story, which  is representative of  the 
experience  of  at  least  three  of  the  major  U.K.  promoters of  foreign  tin  ven- 
tures,  illustrates  the  personal links  which  facilitated  these early  investments. 
Promoters became aware  of  profitable  opportunities  through  direct  personal 
contacts with  friends  or  family  members who  were,  or  had  been, in  the  for- 
eign country.  Stock in  the companies they  floated  was initially  sold to friends 
and  associates in  the  U.K.  Later,  as the  success of  these early  companies  be- 
came  known,  stock  was  subscribed  by  the  general  public.  Given  the  specula- 
tive  nature  of  tin  mining  and  the  general  ignorance  of  Malaya  by  the  British 
public,  appeal  to  the  London  equity  market  by  Chinese-owned  companies 
would  not  have  had  the  •lightest  chance  of  success. 
Because of  the  importance  of  personal links  in  the establishment  of  free- 
standing  companies, their  distribution  across tin  mining  countries  was  un- 153 
even. We would,  for  example,  expect  more companies to  be set up  in  countries 
where  Britishers  were  residing  than  in  those where  there  were  fewer  British 
expatriates.  Consider,  for  example,  the  contrast  between  Siam,  then  an  inde- 
pendent country,  and Malaya,  where the  British  exercised a  strong political 
and  economic  influence.  Both  countries  have  similar  tin  deposits, and  in  re- 
cent  years  Siam's  (now  Thailand)  production  of  tin  concentrates  has  been 
about  half  of  Malaysia's.  Yet,  by  1914,  British  investments  in  Siam  were 
much smaller than  in  Malaya:  there  were only  9 foreign  companies active  in 
Siam, 6 Australian  and  3 British,  compared to 48 in  Malaya,  35 of  them regis- 
tered  in  the United  Kingdom  [14]. 
If  free-standing  firms  internalize  imperfect  capital  markets,  then  they 
may  result  from  firms  in  capital-rich  countries undertaking  operations in 
capital-poor  locales,  or  from  operating  companies  in  capital-poor  countries 
floating  concerns in  capital-rich  countries.  Perhaps  because Britishers  were 
reluctant  to  establish  operations  in  Bolivia,  a  number  of  Bolivian  en- 
trepreneurs  floated  tin  mining  companies  in  London.  Such  was  the  case, for 
example,  of  Aramayo  Francke  and  Co., a  company  registered  in  London  in 
1906 by  the  Aramayo  family  to tap  the  British  capital  market.  Similarly,  Vi- 
laque Bolivian  Tin  Mines was floated  in  London in  1913 by the French  own- 
ers  of  Bolivian  tin  and  gold  mining  properties.  In  both  cases, the  appeal  to 
the  British  public  does not  seem to have  been successful. By  1916, the  Aveli- 
nos and  the Franckes  still  held  most of  the stock of  Aramayo  Francke,  while 
the  vendors  of  Vilaque,  the  Berthin  brothers,  still  held  most of  the  shares in 
the company.  1 Later, Patino  was  to register  his firm in Delaware  to tap the 
U.S. capital  market,  with  much greater  success. 
The  decline of  Western free-standing  firms  can be explained  by the same 
causes which  led  to  their  emergence.  Two  factors  combined  in  the  postwar 
period  to  reduce the  comparative  advantage  that  these firms  enjoyed  relative 
to  their  domestic  competitors.  First,  the  independence  of  host countries  in- 
creased the  costs experienced  by  free-standing  firms  in  channeling  funds 
from  capital-rich  countries.  Unsettled  political  conditions  in  the  host  coun- 
tries,  adverse changes in  the U.K.  tax  treatment  of  dividends  earned  overseas, 
as well  as an  increasingly  hostile  MalaysJan  view  towards  foreign  invest- 
ments, led  to  a  disinvestment  by  foreigners  in  Malaysian  tin  companies. At 
the  same  time  there  was a  development  of  alternative  sources of  finance.  Be- 
tween  1954 and  1964, the percentage of  shares held by  Malaysians  in  Western- 
controlled  companies  registered  in  Malaysia  increased  from  22  to  64  percent 
[28,  p.  359]. This  increased investment  by  locals in  tin  mining  firms,  as well 
as the  growth  of  development  assistance and  of  international  bank  lending, 
removed the only  tangible advantage enjoyed by Western free-standing  firms. 
1Public  Record  Office,  Kew,  BT 31 17888/90459  and  21352/128143. 154 
If  capital  could  be obtained  by  local  firms  from  local  sources or  from  inter- 
national  banks,  the  British-based  free-standing  company  had  no  longer  any 
raison d'etre. By  1986, such firms  had just about disappeared from Malaysia, 
replaced  by  locally-incorporated  companies and  by  a growing  state sector. By 
contrast,  the  greater  backwardness  of  local  tin  miners  in  Nigeria,  their 
greater lack  of  managerial  expertise, and  the absence of  a local stock market 
meant that  British  free  standing firms  met little  competition. Were it  not for 
"Nigerianization"  policies  followed  by  the  local  government,  those  firms 
might still  be profitably  active today. 
Vertical  Investments 
Transaction  costs theory can also help explain  the pattern  of  vertical  in- 
vestments in  tin.  Markets  work  well  when  there  are  many  buyers and  sellers. 
They  suffer  from  high  transactions costs when  the  number  of  buyers and 
sellers falls.  In  that  case, it  is possible for  a trader  to  opportunistically  rene- 
gotiate the terms of  trade. His trading  partner  will  have no other alternative 
than accepting the new terms if  he experiences significant  switching  costs.  In 
small-number  conditions,  traders  can  thus be "held up" by  their  partners. The 
level  of  transaction  costs in  markets,  and  therefore  the  likelihood  of  vertical 
integration, will  hinge on the factors that determine the number of  potential 
buyers and sellers, i.e., scale economies,  transportation  costs,  and the degree to 
which  parties  make investments which  are dedicated  to their  partner's  inputs 
or  outputs. 
The  tin  industry  is singular  in  that  it  can  be partitioned  into  two  dis- 
tinctive  sub-industries,  lode deposits and  alluvial  deposits, which  require  dif- 
ferent  mining  and  smelting methods. These differences  have led  to different 
levels  of  transaction  costs  in  the  case  of  lode  than  in  that  of  alluvial  concen- 
trates. 
Alluvial  deposits are found  mostly in  Southeast Asia. They  are  low grade, 
but  close to  the  surface,  and  can  be  mined  by  low-scale  methods. They  are 
easily  concentrated  through  gravity  to  70-77  percent  tin.  These  concentrates 
contain  few  impurities,  and  can be smelted through  simple methods. Lode  de- 
posits are of  higher grade, but are usually found underground, mainly  in  Bo- 
livia.  The  ores are  more  complex,  containing  many  troublesome impurities. 
Elimination  of  these impurities  involves  a  loss of  tin,  and  lode  concentrates 
only  grade 20 to 60 percent tin.  Smelting such concentrates is tricky,  as the 
process  must be tailored  to the particular  characteristics of  the ore [10]. 
Those technological  differences  have  had  profound  influences  on  indus- 
try  structure.  Because mining  of  alluvial  ores is a relatively  low-scale opera- 
tion,  the  mining  sector of  Malaysia  and  Thailand  has been relatively  atom- 
istic.  Smelting  alluvial  ores is  also competitive,  with  low  barriers  to  entry. 155 
Alluvial  concentrates  are  of  high  grade  and  value  and  are  homogeneous: they 
can be smelted anywhere  and  transported  over  long distances. Alluvial  miners 
thus  face  a  potentially  large  number  of  buyers  for  their  concentrates. As  a 
result,  and  until  recently,  the  traditional  industrial  pattern  in  alluvial  tin  has 
been  one  of  vertical  disintegration:  the  miners  and  the  smelters  have  orga- 
nized  their  interdependence  through  spot  prices  set  on  the  Penang  market. 
The  two MalaysJan smelters have matched the supply of  concentrates received 
from  independent  miners  with  bids  for  tin  metal  from  independent  traders 
and  processors, and  paid  the  miners  the  clearing  price  minus a  smelting  fee. 
Mining  firms  have  not  been  integrated  into  smelting,  while  investments  by 
the two MalaysJan smelters into  mining  have been minimal. 
Lode  tin  is mined  and  smelted  under  very  different  conditions.  The  lode 
mining  sector has always  been more concentrated.  In  contrast  to Malaysia  and 
Thailand,  where  tin  is mined  close to  the coast, Bolivian  mines are  located  in 
relatively  inaccessible parts of  the Andes. Because of  the need to build  exten- 
sive  infrastructure,  operation  at  high  scale  has  conveyed  significant  advan- 
tages.  Concentration  of  Bolivian  ore  also  requires  expensive  equipment. 
Lastly,  the  size  of  lode  deposits is  larger  than  that  of  alluvial  deposits: the 
Uncia  lode, which  launched Patino as a major  tin  producer, is the largest tin 
deposit  ever  found. 
Smelting  lode  ores requires  greater  skill  and  investment.  Smelters able  to 
smelt Bolivian  concentrates  have  always  been few  in  number.  As with  mining, 
the  smelting  of  lode  ores have  been concentrated.  The  market  for  lode  con- 
centrates  has  therefore  been  narrower  than  that  for  alluvial  concentrates. 
These  considerations  explain  why  the  main  instances  of  vertical  integration 
between  mining  and  smelting  (excluding  the  more recent  politically-motivated 
ones) have taken  place in  the lode sector of  the industry. 
The  best known example of  a vertically  integrated  multinational  in tin  is 
Patina  Mines  and  Enterprises.  Simon  Patin's  tin  fortunes  started  with  his dis- 
covery  in  1899 of  an  extremely  rich  tin  vein  in  a  small  mine  he  had  pur- 
chased. By  1910,  he  was  the  largest  Bolivian  producer  of  tin  concentrates, 
with  close to  10 percent  of  world  production.  Patino's  output  ws first  sold  on 
commission by  the  British  trading  firm  of  Penny  and  Duncan  to smelters in 
Liverpool  and  Germany.  One of  them  was Williams,  Harvey,  initially  built  to 
process Cornish  ores, but  by  now  dependent  on Bolivian  concentrates. As his 
production  increased,  Patina  took  increasing  control  over  the  marketing  of 
his ores, bypassing Penny  and  Duncan  and  setting  up  an  office  in  Hamburg 
in  1911 to  place his own  concentrates and  to receive  in  consignment the  con- 
centrates  of  other  producers  [6,  p.  123]. The  blockade  of  Germany  that  fol- 
lowed  the  outbreak  of  World  War  I  closed  to  Patina  the  Goldschmidt  smelter 
that  was smelting his ores, and  they  were all  sent to Williams,  Harvey  in  Liv- 156 
erpool. That  smelter, then  the largest  in  Europe,  had  developed a  proprietary 
technique  to process complex  Bolivian  ores. 
German  submarines soon made  transportation  to  England  difficult,  and 
with  the  opening  of  the  Panama  canal,  it  became apparent  that  Bolivian  ores 
could be advantageously smelted in  the U.S., the main  consumer of  the metal. 
In  1915,  Asarco  decided  to  build  a  smelter  near  New  York  to  treat  Bolivian 
ores. The  opening  of  that  smelter  in  1916  persuaded  Williams,  Harvey  and 
Asarco's main  competitor,  National  Lead,  that  they  should join  forces and  do 
the same. In  1916, National  Lead  took  a  half  share in  Williams,  Harvey  in  ex- 
change for  cash and  a half  share in  the new  U.S. smelter. Before  proceeding, 
Williams,  Harvey  attempted  to enlist  the support of  the Exploration  Company 
to take  over  Patino's  properties.  Unsuccessful,  it  then  asked  Patino  for  a  five 
year  contract  for  the  production  of  his mines, then  about  10,000 tons a  year, 
enough  to  support  an  efficiently-sized  smelter.  Patino  proposed  instead  to 
purchase a  one-third  share in  both  smelters, a  proposition  which  was readily 
accepted?  Patino's  vertically  integrated  empire  was  broken  up in 1952  with 
the  nationalization  of  his  Bolivian  tin  properties,  but  the  vertical  links  were 
reconstituted  with  the  establishment  of  state-owned  smelters  in  Bolivia  in 
1970. There  are other  historical examples of  the tendency for  the  market  for 
Bolivian  concentrates  to  be  vertically  integrated,  such  as  Asarco's develop- 
ment  of  a  captive  Bolivian  property  in  the  1920s and  Goldschmidt's  interest 
in  a Bolivian  mine before  1914 [18; 13, p. 675]. 
CONCLUSION 
Taking  the example of  the tin  industry,  this  paper has attempted  to show 
that  transaction  costs  theory  can  provide  a  useful  framework  for  un- 
derstanding  the  growth  and  development  of  multinational  firms.  The  bulk  of 
horizontal  investments in  tin  were  made by  British-based  free  standing  firms. 
These firms,  which  differ  considerably  from  present day  multinationals,  can 
be explained  within  the context of  transaction  costs theory  as institutions  de- 
vised  to  facilitate  the  international  transfer  of  capital  from  capital-rich  to 
capital-poor  countries?  They evolved  as a solution  to a paradox:  because  of 
significant  communication  costs due  to cultural  and  geographic  distance,  local 
businessmen,  who  knew  best of  local  opportunities,  had  difficulties  obtaining 
2This  information  is derived from the records  of Frank Harvey, one of the 
partners  in  Williams,  Harvey,  kept  at  the  Cornwall  County  Records  Office, 
Truro,  Cornwall. 
SThe  argument  is similar  to that put forth in a recent  piece  by Wilkins  [25].  I 
differ  from  her,  however,  in  my assessment  of  the  reasons behind  the decline 
of  free-standing  companies. 157 
finance,  while  those individuals  who  had  investible  funds  were  unaware  of 
these profitable  investments. In  Malaya,  the local  offices  of  British  Imperial 
banks,  who  had  both  the  funds  and  the  knowledge,  would  not  lend  long-term 
to local  miners. Tapping  the London  capital  market  was difficult  for  foreign- 
ers, as they did  not have in  London the reputation  necessary to instill  confi- 
dence.  Instead,  the  initiative  of  internalization  often  proceeded  from  the 
other  side: Britishers  who  had  learned  about  opportunities  in  Malaya  through 
personal contacts, and  who  were  well  connected and  reputable,  floated  com- 
panies in  the  U.K.  to  operate  in  Malaya.  Case studies of  the development  of 
free  standing  firms  seem to support  this  view:  they  show promoters to be in- 
dividuals  active  in  tin  (engineers, solicitors,  or  share brokers)  and  with  per- 
sonal links  to the  places of  investment. 
Although  the  transfer  of  capital  through  free-standing  firms  was  often 
characterized  by  high  transaction  costs, and  a  large  number  of  such firms 
were  swindles,  the  history  of  these  firms  in  tin  shows  that,  in  contrast  to 
their  record  in  the  United  States [20;  24],  Canada  [16],  and  Australia  [8], 
many were efficient,  profitable,  and long lived. They  survived as long as they 
filled  their  original  role,  and  the political  and tax  environments  were  not too 
unfavorable. 
The  development of  vertically  integrated  multinational  enterprises in  tin 
also  supports  the  view  that  vertically  integrated  multinational  enterprises 
arise  in  specific  circumstances,  i.e.,  whenever  intermediate  markets  are  sub- 
ject  to  high  transaction  costs. Miners  in  Malaya  and  Siam  never  took  control 
of  the  Malaysian  firms  that  smelted  their  ores because they  could  sell  their 
concentrates  on  competitive  markets.  Because  of  economies  of  scale  at  both 
stages, and  because the  number  of  smelters able  to  handle  Bolivian  concen- 
trates has always been limited,  the market  for  such concentrates is much nar- 
rower.  Consequently,  and  in  contrast  to Malaya  and  Siam,  miners  and  smelters 
of  lode  concentrates have  sought to  organize  their  interdependence through 
common  ownership,  and  one  uncovers  many  instances of  vertical  integration 
in  that  segment of  the tin  industry. 
Naturally,  not  all  features  of  multinational  expansion  can  be  explained 
by  transaction  costs. Transaction  cost  theory  posits  that  the  boundaries  of 
firms  are  determined  by  the  minimization  of  such costs. The  applicability  of 
the  model  is  thus  restricted  to  situations  where  individuals  are  both  free  to 
choose the  most  efficient  institutional  forms  and  forced  to  do  so  through 
competitive  pressures.  The  theory  also focuses on the  internalization  of  non- 
pecuniary  externalities,  and  ignores  institutional  changes  that  result  from 
market  power.  This  paper  has  attempted  to  show  that,  these  limitations 
notwithstanding,  transaction  costs theory  can provide  a useful  framework  to 
understand  a wide  range of  multinational  firms. 158 
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